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The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-3(2)(k) (1993 Supp.). 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. The Trial Court's Failure to State the Grounds for its Decision. 
a. Issue for Review: Whether the trial committed reversible er-
ror by refusing to include in its order a statement of the grounds for its deci-
sion. 
b. Standard for Review: The order of the trial court shall be 
reviewed to determine whether the refusal to include a statement of the 
grounds for its decision amounts "to prejudicial error." Dover Elevator v. 
Hill Mangum Invest, 766 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah App. 1988). 
2. The Indemnity Agreement. 
a. Issue for Review: Whether the indemnity provisions of the 
"Application for Recognition of Grading Races" are clear and unambiguous 
and should be enforced. 
b. Standard for Review: The decision of the trial court in grant-
ing summary judgment will be reviewed to determine whether it correctly 
held there were no genuine issues of fact and that its legal decision was 
correct. Weese v. Davis County Com'n 834 P.2d 1, 2-3 (Utah 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Plaintiffs are the parents of Peter Chavez, a horse jockey who was seri-
ously injured in a horse racing accident at the Dixie Downs horse racing 
track in St. George, Utah on April 21, 1989. Washington County allegedly 
owned and maintained the track; the St. George Lions Club (hereinafter 
referred to as the "Lions Club") allegedly operated, installed and maintained 
the racetrack and equipment; and, the American Quarter Horse Association 
(hereinafter referred to as the "AQHA") sanctioned the results of the race. 
The plair^fifs allege these defendants were negligent. 
The AQHA filed a third party complaint seeking indemnity against the 
International Association of Lions Clubs (hereinafter referred to as the 
"International"). The indemnity claim is based on provisions contained in 
the Application for Recognition of Grading Races dated nine months before 
the accident and executed by an agent of the Lions Club who, it is alleged, is 
a subsidiary of the International. The Application for Recognition of Grading 
Races shall hereinafter be referred to as the "indemnity agreement." The 
AQHA alleged that the International should be bound by the indemnity 
agreement on the basis that the Lions Club was acting as the International's 
agent when it executed the agreement. 
B. Course of Proceeding » H disposition In the Trial Court. 
This case was filed on July 19, 1991. The plaintiffs filed their First 
Amended Complaint on September 18, 1992. The AQHA filed its answer to 
the First Amended Complaint on December 21, 1992. The other defendants 
also filed their answers. The AQHA's answer included a third party 
complaint against the International. Thereafter the parties conducted 
discovery on the plaintiffs' claims. 
On May 7, 1993 the International served its Motion for Summary Judg-
ment. The issues were briefed by the International and the AQHA. On June 
14, 1993 there was oral argument on the International's motion. The court 
granted summary judgment to the International from the bench and signed 
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an Order which indicates that "there are no disputed material facts on the 
record and that The International is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 
. . ." Transcript pg. 956 - 958. The summary judgment order does not indi-
cate the basis for the court's holding. 
Prior to the entry of the Order, on June 28, 1993, the AQHA filed its 
Objections to the International Association of Lions Clubs' Summary Judg-
ment Order. Transcript pg. 904-909. The court did not hear oral argument 
on the AQHA's objection and the order granting summary judgment was 
entered in favor of the International on July 7, 1993. The AQHA's Notice of 
Appeal was served on August 5, 1993. Thereafter, the Utah Court of Appeals 
moved, on its own motion, to consider this appeal for summary disposition 
on the grounds that the appeal may not have been properly certified. The 
parties filed briefs in response to this court's motion. On January 4, 1994, 
the Utah Court of Appeals issued an Order holding that the appeal was 
property before it. 
C. Statement of Relevant Facts. 
1. The subject of this appeal is the enforceability of the indemnity 
provisions contained in the "Application for Recognition of Grading Races." 
The indemnity agreement was signed by Joe Bowcutt who was the track 
manager for the St. George Lions Club. A copy of the indemnity agreement is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. The same indemnity agreement appeared as 
Exhibit A of the International's Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment as to the American Quarter Horse Association's Third-
Party Complaint, Transcript pg. 703. 
2. The AQHA alleged that the Lions Club is a subsidiary of the 
International and that the AQHA is entitled to indemnity over and against 
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the International and the Lions Club pursuant to the above-referenced agree-
ment. TYanscript pg. 500-501. 
3. The International^ motion for summary judgment sought judg-
ment against the AQHA's claim that the Lions Club was a subsidiary of the 
International and that the agreement was enforceable. Transcript pg. 670-
705. 
4. The trial courts bench ruling, which granted the International's 
motion for summary judgment, did not decide whether the lions Club was a 
subsidiary of the International. Instead, the trial court's ruling was based 
on its conclusion that the indemnity agreement could not bind the Lions 
Club or the International Insofar as any claim arises and a liability is 
created because the regulations created an unsafe condition, . . ." Reporter's 
Hearing TVanscript June 14, 1993, pg. 45,11. 12-16. 
5. The trial court's written order granting summary judgment does 
not specify upon which alternative theory the trial court based its summary 
judgment order. Transcript pg. 956 - 958. Consequently, the appellant has 
relied upon the Reporter's Hearing Transcript to determine the issues ruled 
upon by the trial court. The transcript states: ui don't think I need, then, to 
go on and deal with the questions of — of agency." Reporter's Hearing 
Transcript, June 14, 1993, pg. 45, 11. 18-20. Therefore, whether the 
International is a party to the Lions Club indemnity agreement is a fact 
which must be assumed because the trial court made no decision on the 
issue. 
6. The plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint contains the following 
relevant allegations with respect to the defendants' negligence: 
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a. Designing, maintaining, installing, and sanctioning the in-
side rail at a height which was dangerous to both horse and rider; 
b. Designing, maintaining, installing, and sanctioning the 
chain-link fence leading to the saddling paddock area by connecting such 
chain-link fence perpendicular to the inside rail in the proximity of the finish 
line; 
c. Failing to install a safety rail to protect both horse and 
rider; 
d. Failing to have proper rules, regulations, and policies re-
garding inside rail safety; 
e. Designing, maintaining, installing, and sanctioning the gap 
leading to the saddling paddock area in dangerously close proximity to the 
chain-link fence complained of above. 
Transcript, pg. 354 - 355. 
7. Trie plaintiffs' Answers to Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories 
and Requests for Production contains interrogatory No. 1 which asks 
whether the plaintiffs know of any evidence suggesting that the inside rail 
in the vicinity of the accident did not meet American Quarter horse standard 
height of 30 inches to 42 inches. In response, the plaintiffs answered: 
"Deposition testimony of Frank Moore, Butch Jones, Joe Landon, and Joe 
Wise suggest that at various places around the track the height of the inside 
rail may have been less than 30 inches." Plaintiffs Answers to Defendant's 
First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production, pg. 4. 
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court failed to provide a statement of the grounds for its 
summary judgment decision. Rule 52(a), Utah Rides of Civil Procedure re-
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quires a statement of the grounds for a judgment when there is more than 
one basis for the party's summary judgment motion. Without such a 
statement, the appellate court can only rely on the transcript of the hearing 
to determine the grounds for the ruling and the issues which can properly 
heard on appeal. 
2. The trial court, according to the hearing transcript, did not rule 
that the indemnity agreement was unenforceable. Instead, the court 
identified circumstances which would allow the enforcement of the 
indemnity agreement. The court considered evidence, which was not 
consistent with the record, in determining that the indemnity agreement did 
not fit the circumstances of this case. The evidence in this case, however, 
suggests that facts exist which may fit the circumstances in which the court 
would permit the indemnity agreement to operate. If so, then summary 
judgment was inappropriate. 
3. Strict construction of the indemnity agreement permits enforce-
ment of the indemnity provision for the AQHA's own negligence. The term 
"unsafe conditions* is sufficiently clear and unequivocal that it includes 
neg! ice for unsafe or improper regulations. The strict construction rule 
shot tot be used to render it impossible to draft an enforceable indemnity 
provi i. 
4. The existence of the agreement is evidence that the parties did not 
want common law rules to govern the indemnity obligations for the race. 
Instead the parties wanted the agreement to govern the indemnity 
obligations. If there is no indemnity for causes of actions attacking th-
AQHA's regulations, there is, ultimately, no protection for the QHA because 
any lawsuit involving a horse racing accident would result in an attack 
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upon the AQHA regulations. The indemnity agreement should be construed 
to give effect to the intent of the parties. 
ARGUMENTS 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROVIDE A STATEMENT OF THE 
GROUNDS FOR ITS SUMMARY JUDGMENT DECISION 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires the trial court to 
"issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all motions 
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is 
based on more than one ground." 
The International's motion for summary judgment was based on more 
than one ground. The International argued it was not bound by the indem-
nity agreement (Transcript pg. 679); that the indemnity agreement is not 
valid under Utah law (Transcript pg. 683); and, that it is not vicariously 
liable for the St. George Lions Club's Contractual Obligations (Transcript pg. 
685). 
The trial court's Summary Judgment in favor of Third-Party Defendant 
International Association of Lions Clubs does not state which grounds the 
trial court relied upon to render its decision. (Transcript pg. 956 - 958). 
The AQHA objected to the International's proposed summary judgment 
order on the ground, among others, that it failed "to state the grounds upon 
which summary judgment was granted . . . . " (Transcript pg. 905). 
"Normally, failure to comply with Utah RCiv.P. 52(a) would constitute 
reversible error.'* Douer Elevator v. Hill Mangum Invest, 766 P.2d 424, 426 
(Utah App. 1988). If the appellate court cannot determine from the record 
and the Reporter's Hearing Transcript the grounds justifying the trial court's 
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sumr / judgment order, then failure to do so "may justify remand to the 
trial court." Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499, 501 (Utah App. 1989). 
The AQHA requests this court to remand this case to the trial court 
with instructions to comply with Rule 52(a) if it is determined the issues ar-
gued herein cannot be resolved based on the record before the court. 
n. 
ISSUES OF FACT PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The International's Motion for Summary Judgment asked the Court tc 
grant summary judgment on several grounds. Although the trial court's 
summary judgment order does not indicate which ground the court used to 
make its ruling, the hearing transcript reveals the basis for the trial court's 
holding. 
The transcript of the trial court's bench ruling indicates the court did 
not rule the indemnity agreement was unenforceable. Instead, the court, in 
several places, held the indemnity agreement would require the Lions Club 
and the International to indemnify the AQHA under certain circumstances. 
Several quotations from the transcript identify those circumstances: 
I think what this agreement says is that the St. George 
Lions Club agrees to conduct their race meet in 
accordance with the requirements of the American 
Quarter Horse Association regulations, and that that's 
the standard for safe conditions on the track, and that 
so long as they comply with -- so long as no 
conditions exist on tne track which violate the 
American Quarter Horse Association's regulations, that 
the local club will indemnify the American Quarter 
Horse Association for any problems that arise out of 
unsafe conditions. Reporter s Hearing Transcript, June 
14, 1993, pg. 40,11. 16-25. 
In another place the trial court states: 
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I interpret the agreement to be that so long as the 
conditions of the track complied with the 
requirements of the American Quarter Horse 
Association's regulations, they are deemed to be safe. 
Any departure from those regulations creates an 
unsafe condition for which the local club is re-
sponsible for indemnifying the Quarter Horse 
Association. Reporter's Hearing Transcript, June 14, 
1993, pg. 44-45, fi. 23-25, 1-4. 
Similarly, the trial court held: 
I think if you read that entire agreement together, it 
says, "Our regulations comply or govern this race 
meet. You're to conduct it in accordance with our 
regulations. And if you don't, you're going to have to 
indemnify us for any injury that occurs." And insofar 
as any claim arises and a liability is created because 
the regulations created an unsafe condition, I don't 
think his indemnity agreement binds the Lions Club, 
either local or International, to indemnify the Quarter 
Horse Association. 
So that would be my ruling on that argument, and 
that's why I raised the question. I don't think I need, 
then, to go on and deal with the questions of — of 
agency. Reporter's Hearing Transcript, June 14, 1993, 
pg. 4511. 7-20 (emphasis added). 
The court concluded the facts fit the interpretation of the indemnity 
agreement which precluded enforcement. In so doing, the court understood, 
incorrectly, that the plaintiffs' allegations in their First Amended Complaint 
were limited to a situation in which liability would be based upon a finding 
that the AQHA regulations were beneath the standard of care and that the 
physical conditions of the track met all AQHA regulations. Reporter's 
Hearing TVanscript June 14, 1993, pg. 42-44. 
The plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint suggests that potential liability 
against the AQHA may be based upon the violation of standards which are 
not addressed by the AQHA regulations. The allegations of the First 
Amended Complaint suggest the Lions Club could be found negligent for 
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"designing, maintaining, installing, and sanctioning the inside rail at a 
height which was dangerous to both horse and rider." Transcript pg. 354 -
355. Those allegations and the others which refer to the "safety rail" and the 
"gap leading to the saddling paddock area" do not refer to the AQHA 
regulations. A jury verdict which concludes the rail and the gap are 
"dangerous" could result in liability regardless of whether it was determined 
that the AQHA regulations were improper. Thus, if facts were before the 
court which, based on its own interpretation of the indemnity agreement, 
allowed enforcement of the indemnity agreement, then summary judgment 
was improperly granted. 
A decision based on Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires the 
court to evaluate the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any" to determine whether 
"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." In this case, there were 
material issues of fact which existed in the record precluding summary 
judgment 
For example, the plaintiffs* Answers to Defendant's First Set of 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production contains interrogatory no. 1 
which asks whether the plaintiffs know of any evidence suggesting that the 
inside rail in the vicinity of the accident did not meet American Quarter 
horse standard height of 30 inches to 42 inches. In response the plaintiffs* 
answered: 'Deposition testimony of Ftank Moore, Butch Jones, Joe Landon, 
and Joe Wise suggest that at various places around the track the height of 
the inside rail may have been less than 30 inches." Plaintiffs Answers to 
Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production, pg. 4. 
10 
The plaintiffs' answer to interrogatory no. 1 indicates there may be evi-
dence that the rail height did not meet the AQHA standards. Accordingly, 
since the trial court held that "Any departure from those regulations creates 
an unsafe condition for which the local club is responsible for indemnifying 
the Quarter Horse Association" summary judgment on the indemnity agree-
ment should not be granted because a circumstance exists which, by the 
court's own ruling, would permit enforcement of the agreement. 
Similarly, the AQHA regulations do not require the use of a so called 
"safety raiT; however, the plaintiffs* may introduce evidence that a safety rail 
should have been used. Plaintiffs* former counsel stated in the deposition of 
Richard Fontana that *[h]e may say that a Fontana Safety Rail may have 
prevented this accident." Deposition of Richard Fontana, pg. 51,11. 1-2. Mr. 
Fontana states: 
WITNESS: What you just asked me is should there 
have been a Fontana Safety Rail? Of course, I would 
like to see a Fontana Safety Rail. 
* * * * 
WITNESS: The standards don't say a Fontana Safety 
Rail, to begin with. The standards call for certain 
types of rail configurations and design, yes. I truly 
believe if there's horse racing and there's money 
involved at a facility, they should have the standard 
— a rail that's in those standards. 
Now, may that be a Fontana Safety Rail to meet those 
standards or another type of rail? My answer is yes, 
definitely. 
Deposition of Richard Fontana, pg. 51, U. 5-7, 13-21. 
The deposition of Richard Fontana indicates that a evidence exists from 
which the jury could conclude that a safety rail should have been used. A 
safety rail is not part of the AQHA regulations. Therefore, since the trial 
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court held that "Any departure from those regulations creates an unsafe 
condition for which the local club is responsible for indemnifying the 
Quarter Horse Association" summary judgment on the indemnity agreement 
should not be granted because a circumstance exists which, by the court's 
own ruling, would permit enforcement of the agreement. 
HL 
UTAH'S STRICT CONSTRUCTION RULE ALLOWS ENFORCEMENT 
OF THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT 
An analysis of the indemnity contract under the strict construction rule 
indicates that "[a] party is contractually obligated to assume ultimate finan-
cial responsibility for the negligence of another only when that intention is 
'clearly and unequivocally expressed.1" A strict reacmg of the contract, 
while at the same time looking "at the contract as a whole to determine the 
parties1 intent," requires enforcement of the AQHA indemnity agreement, 
Gordon v. CRS Consulting Engineers, Inc. 820 P.2d 492, 494 (Utah Ap; 
1991). 
The indemnity agreement is part of an Application for Recognition of 
Grading Races. The "Applicant agrees to comply fully with the terms and 
conditions of this application and the American Quarter Horse Association 
Regulations for Approved Grading Meets. 20th edition . . . ." See Exhibit A. 
The decision to require track operators to comply with those regulations in-
creased the AQHA's exposure to further liability if, as in this case, a party ar-
gued those regulations were deficient. 
The increased liability exposure created the need for the next portion of 
the indemnity agreement which states: "Tentative approval of this 
application by AQHA does not establish said Association the insurer or 
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guarantor of the safety or physical condition of Operator's facilities " 
See Exhibit A. The AQHA recognized the increased potential of liability as a 
result of accidents which would occur even if the AQHA regulations were 
followed. Consequently, the provision stated above was drafted to express 
the intent that the AQHA, even though requiring the track to conduct the 
race according to its regulations, was not going to insure or guarantee that 
safety of the race. 
The next provision of the indemnity agreement provides the final solu-
tion to the problem created by the increased potential of liability as a result 
of accidents which may occur even if the AQHA regulations were followed. 
The provision states: "Applicant does hereby agree to indemnify, save and 
hold harmless the American Quarter Horse Association from any liability 
arising from unsafe conditions of track facilities or grandstand " See 
Exhibit A. 'Unsafe conditions" is synonymous to saying: ". . . any liability 
arising from negligence" and encompasses regulations which may be found, 
by a jury, to be beneath the standard of care. 
Opposing counsel would probably argue that the provision does not say 
that indemnity shall include indemnification for unsafe regulations and that 
if the AQHA had wanted such indemnity, it should have expressly stated it. 
This argument highlights the difficulty the strict construction rule imposes 
upon drafters. If the agreement was worded pursuant to the anticipated ar-
gument, then the same argument would allow counsel, in another situation 
involving an accident, to argue that the indemnity agreement should not be 
enforced because it did not specifically identify which regulations would be 
subject to indemnity. Strict Construction should not impose drafting obsta-
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cles which lead infinitely toward a conclusion that the agreement is ambigu-
ous and unenforceable. 
The phrase "unsafe conditions" is sufficient to include the AQHA rules 
and regulations. If a jury concluded those rules and regulations were 
beneath the standard of care, then one would not torture the English 
language by stating that regulations created an "unsafe condition/ 
The parties to the indemnity agreement intended its provisions to do 
something or they would not have signed it. The AQHA only sanctioned the 
race. Hie AQHA did not want to guarantee or insure the safety of the race 
just because they sanctioned it; therefore, the indemnity must go to its regu-
lations or it accomplishes nothing. 
TV. 
THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT SHOULD BE CONSTRUED 
TO GIVE MEANING TO THE CONTRACT 
A. The Development of Utah Case Law Continues to Move Away From 
the Strict Construction of Indemnity Agreements. 
In 1989, the Utah Court of Appeals recognized "that the contemporary 
judicial trend is to limit the application of the strict construction rule," 
Pickhover v. Smith's Management Corp. 771 P.2d 664, 667 (Utah App. 1989). 
The court stated: *[W]e believe the law of Utah should develop consistent 
with this trend." Id. This appeal of the trial court's summary judgment 
order in favor of the International provides the Court with the appropriate 
circumstances to continue the trend away from the rigid application of the 
strict construction rule. The trend away from the strict construction rule 
permits the conclusion at the indemnity agreement is enforceable because 
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no other interpretation provides any reasonable meaning to the indemnity 
agreement. 
Hie trend away from the strict construction rule was addressed by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Freund v. Utah Power & Light Company, 793 P.2d 
362 (Utah 1990). The indemnity agreement in Freund involved a commercial 
setting. The court quoted two cases for the proposition that: 
In such circumstances it is not necessary that the ex-
culpatory language refers expressly to the negligence 
of tne indemnitee, so long as the intention to indem-
nify can be "dearly implied from the language and 
purposes of the entire agreement, and the surrounding 
tacts and circumstances.19 
Freund at 370 (quoting Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority v. Tri-
Delta Construction Corp. 107 A.D.2d 450, 451, 487 N.Y.S.2d 428, 430 (1985) 
and Margolin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 32 N.Y.2d 149, 153, 344 N.Y.S.2d 336, 
339, 297 N.E.2d 80, 82 (1973)). The court concluded: "We agree that in 
strictly construing the contractual language, evaluating the indemnification 
agreement according to the objectives of the parties and the surrounding 
facts and circumstances is entirely appropriate." Id. 
The holding in Freund involved an indemnity agreement entered into in 
a commercial setting. The agreement between the AQHA, the Uons Club and 
the International probably was not commercial. Even so, the intention of the 
parties should be determined by evaluating their objectives and the 
surrounding facts and circumstances. 
B. The Objectives and Surrounding Facts and Circumstances Reveal 
the Intentions of the Parties. 
Strict construction does not necessarily mean that an indemnity con-
tract must use the word "negligence" to clearly and unequivocally create an 
obligation to indemnify for the indemnitee's negligence. 
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In Gordon v. CRS Consulting Engineers, Inc. 820 P.2d 492 (Utah App. 
1991), the court recognized that "[ijn interpreting a contract, we look at the 
contract as a whole to determine the parties* intent. Id. at 494, The applica-
tion of the strict construction rule with respect to an indemnity agreement 
results in the "presumption against an intent to indemnify unless 'that 
intention is clearly and unequivocally expressed." Id. (quoting Union Pac. 
R.R. v. El Paso Nat'l Gas Co., 408 P.2d 910, 913 (1965)). 
Overcoming the presumption against an intent to indemnify for the in-
demnitee's negligence is possible because the expression of a clear and un-
equivocal intent to indemnify can be found from the surrounding circum-
stances. 
The beginning point to determine the intent of the parties is a simple 
conclusion drawn from the fact that the parties signed the agreement: Sine * 
tfc agreement included indemnity provisions it follows, at least, that the 
parties intended the agreement rather than common law rules, to govern 
their rig>i,s and liabilities regarding indemnity obligations for the horse 
races. 
The Oregon Supreme Court recognized this approach in Southern Pacific 
Co. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 338 P.2d 665 (Or. 1959). Oregon court's also 
use the strict construction rule holding that "indemnity agreements are not 
construed to cover losses to the indemnitee caused by his own negligence 
unless such effect is expressed clearly and unequivocally/1 Id. at 671 • 
In Hi Southern Pacific case, the court ruled upon the enforceability of a 
similar indemnity provision. The relevant portions of the provision state: 
Said bunker shall be constructed and maintained at all 
times in a manner satisfactory to Railroad. . . . [similar 
to the AQHA provision requiring the Applicant to 
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comply with its regulations] Industry hereby agrees to 
indemnify and save harmless Railroad, its agents, 
successors and assigns from all liability, costs and 
expenses resulting directly or indirectly from the 
presence or use of said bunker. [Similar to the AQHA 
provision requiring indemnity from any liability aris-
ing from unsafe conditions.] 
Id. at 667. 
The Oregon court reasoned that the parties intended to indemnify the 
Railroad from its own negligence because "the Industry was dependent to a 
large degree upon the cooperation of the Railroad, without which the bunker 
would have been of little or no value to it." Id. at 672-673. Similarly, the 
Lions Club and the International depended to a large degree upon the 
AQHA's willingness to sanction the results of the horse races. Thus, the 
AQHA, by providing the Lions Club and the International with the 
guidelines which would allow the races to be sanctioned, "exposed itself to 
the hazards of an increased, immeasurable tort liability. Under the 
circumstances, it was only natural and the exercise of sound business 
judgment that the [AQHA] would demand protection including the 
consequences of its own acts." Id. at 673. 
The evaluation of the circumstances together with the language of the 
indemnity agreement allowed the Oregon Court to conclude that the 
intention to indemnify for the negligence of the indemnitee was clearly and 
unequivocally expressed. 
[W]e feel that the indemnity provision here is clear, 
certain, and sufficiently broad and comprehensive, so 
as to warrant only the conclusion that the true in-
tendment of the agreement was to save Southern 
Pacific harmless from its negligence under these cir-
cumstances. 
Id. at 674. 
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An important step in the analysis used by the court in Southern Pacific 
was the recognition that the terms of the indemnity provision should have 
some meaning from the fact the parties signed the agreement. The court held 
tha t" We do not think the parties here intended such an idle gesture by the 
inclusion of the recovery provision. Unless the parties intended to embrace 
liabilities resulting from the Railroad's negligence, [the indemnity agreement] 
can have no meaning." Id. at 674. 
Likewise, the AQHA indemnity agreement has no meaning unless the 
agreement is construed to include indemnity for the AQHA's own negligence. 
Without he indemnity provisions, the simple act—when compared with the 
involved and numerous acts necessary to maintain the track facilities and 
conduct the races—of sanctioning the races results in potential liability 
which far exceeds the usual risks common to the AQHA's ordinary 
operations. The AQHA drafted the indemnity provisions of the agreement to 
avoid those potential risks of increased liability. 
The court in Southern Pacific Co. accepted a construction of the contract 
which gave meaning to the contract. The AQHA indemnity agreement 
should be construed in a similar fashion because, otherwise, no meaning is 
given to the expressed intent that the indemnity agreement govern the 
parties1 rights and not some other common law principles. 
CONCLUSION 
The AQHA requests the Utah Court of Appeals to reverse the trial 
court's summary judgment decision in favor of the International. The record 
contains facts from which a jury could conclude that the indemnity 
agreement is applicable given the trial court's interpretation of the 
agreement. The enforceability of the indemnity agreement and its application 
18 
to the negligence of the AQHA, including its regulations, is clearly and 
unequivocally stated in the provisions which speak of "unsafe conditions." 
Furthermore, failing to enforce the indemnity provisions for the AQHA's own 
negligence renders the agreement meaningless because the AQHA does 
nothing for which liability could be imposed except ask that its regulations 
be followed. 
The appellant has argued that summary judgment was granted because 
the trial court determined the indemnity agreement was unenforceable given 
the facts it considered. The appellant could not argue the issues of agency 
presented in the International's Motion for Summary Judgment because, as 
the hearing transcript reveals, the trial did not rule on those issues; 
therefore, they could not be appealed. Consequently, if the appellate court 
cannot determine this appeal based upon the rulings preserved in the 
hearing transcript, then the AQHA asks the appellate court to remand this 
case to the trial court with direction to enter a statement of the grounds for 
its decision. 
DATED this J/_ day of March, 1994. 
DUNN & DUNN 
TIM DALTON DUNN 
GLEN T. HALE 
Attorneys for Appellant 
(Original signature) 
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EXHIBIT " A 
t • i . • 
APPLICATION FOR RECOGNITION OF GRAOING. RACES 
Track Operator S T CEQREF I TOWS CLUB 
(Name of P e r s o n [ s ) or 
l ization; if organization, name of autnorized representative) herein arter rererred 
» "Applicant", hereby applies for recognition by American Quarter Horse Association 
Yd grading races at 
i i s located at 
nit ion i s requested for 
DIXIE DOWNS 
(Name or I rack J 
P.O. BOX 214 
(Mai ling Address) 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770 
(City, State and Zip Code) 
grading races to be held on the following dates: 
APRIL 21 & 22, 1989 
APRIL 28 & 29, 1989 
Applicant agrees to comply fully with the terms and conditions of this application 
he American Quarter'Horse Association Regulations for top roved Grading Meets, 20th 
on, or any future edition or amendment thereof (which publication is incorporated 
in by reference and made a part hereof for all purposes) and Applicant's failure to 
rniply will be cause for refusal of recognition of :any and all races, and will 
rdize any further approval of races conducted by Applicant. When the Association 
that all races have been conducted according to this agreement, and all other 
ations of the Association, then, and only in such event, will such races be 
nized and charted. 
Tentative approval of this application by AQHA does not establish said Association 
nsurer or guarantor of the safety or physical condition of Operator's fac i l i t i e s , 
s of any race, or reasonableness of stewards1 rulings; hov/ever, Applicant does 
y agree to indemnity, save and hold harmless the American Quarter Horse Association 
any l iabi l i ty arising from unsafe conditions of track facil it ies or grandstand, 
It in payment of stakes or purses, or publication or dissemination by Association of 
nation concerning any disciplinary rulings of Applicant's stewards. 
application is signed in duplicate on this the 13th day of Julv 
Signature (Operator and/or Uwaer) 
P.O. Box 214 
™ Sn. Cgprof. Utah ft£770 
Adoress (Operator and/or Owner) 
